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DEATH WISH: WHAT WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD DO
WHEN A CAPITAL DEFENDANT WANTS TO DIE
Laura A. Rosenwald
Abstract: The Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Dodd that a capital defendant
may waive general review of conviction and sentence, and failed to determine whether a
defendant may also withhold all mitigating evidence from the sentencing proceeding. The
holding limits appellate oversight of death sentences to a degree that fails to ensure Wash-
ington's interest in reliable capital punishment. The court should have required general
review of both conviction and sentencing in all capital cases. It also should have estab-
lished a procedure for third-party presentation of mitigating evidence on behalf of capital
defendants who insist on withholding such evidence.
In State v. Dodd,1 the Washington Supreme Court for the first time
encountered a capital defendant who wanted to die. Westley Allan
Dodd confessed to the 1989 rapes and murders of William and Cole
Neer, brothers aged ten and eleven, and Lee Iseli, aged four.2 Dodd
pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death by a jury,3 and waived his
appeal rights.'
The supreme court held that a capital defendant may waive general
review for error of a conviction and sentence,5 but that the court was
required by the governing statute to review Dodd's sentence to ensure
that it was proportional, based on sufficient evidence, and not the
result of passion or prejudice.6 Although the court failed to decide
whether a capital defendant may withhold all mitigating evidence
from the sentencing proceeding,7 it tacitly conceded that such evi-
dence is indispensable by considering Dodd's mitigating evidence in its
statutory review of his sentence.8
This Note argues that the Dodd court should have required general
review for error of a capital conviction and sentence, and should have
established a procedure for third-party presentation of mitigating evi-
dence at sentencing when a defendant refuses to offer such evidence.
The Note contends that the Dodd holding that capital defendants may
waive general review compromises the state's interest in reliable capi-
tal punishment and sentence review, and results from a flawed analy-
1. 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86 (1992).
2. Id. at 4-6, 838 P.2d at 88-89.
3. Id. at 10, 838 P.2d at 90.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 4, 838 P.2d at 87.
6. Id. at 24, 838 P.2d at 97-98.
7. Id. at 30-31, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 24-25, 838 P.2d at 98.
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sis. It criticizes the court's failure to establish a procedure to obtain
mitigating evidence when a defendant such as Dodd chooses to with-
hold it.
I. HOW STATE v. DODD AROSE
The police arrested Dodd in November 1989, after he tried to kid-
nap six-year-old James Kirk from a movie theater in Camas, Washing-
ton.9 Dodd immediately confessed to the murders of three other
young boys. 10 Police later found in his apartment a diary in which he
had recounted those murders.'
Dodd originally pleaded not guilty to three counts of first degree
murder and one count each of attempted murder and kidnapping. 2
He changed his pleas to guilty, however, when the trial judge denied
his motions to suppress his confessions and his diary.13 A jury was
empanelled to determine his sentence.
At the sentencing proceeding, Dodd again moved to exclude his
diary. 4 After the judge admitted excerpts, Dodd refused to allow his
attorneys to call witnesses to offer mitigating evidence on his behalf.15
The witnesses would have praised Dodd's performance as a middle
school band member, described his parents' feuding and divorce and
his physical ineptitude as a boy, and recalled that he once cried in
remorse over having molested children.' 6
Prosecutors showed the sentencing jury an album with photographs
of Iseli before and after his death and of Dodd's bed with the ropes
that Dodd used to tie up Iseli.17 They also read diary excerpts about
his crimes and his plans for castration, vivisection, and other torture
that Dodd had not performed on his victims.1 Finally, prosecutors
reviewed Dodd's lengthy record of child molestation convictions.19
9. Id at 5, 838 P.2d at 87.
10. Id. at 4-6, 838 P.2d at 88.
11. Id. at 6-8, 838 P.2d at 88-89.
12. Id. at 8, 838 P.2d at 89.
13. Id. at 8-9, 838 P.2d at 89. The trial court accepted Dodd's guilty plea after hearing
testimony by a psychiatrist and Dodd's attorney concerning Dodd's competency to plead guilty,
and after determining that Dodd's plea was voluntary. Id at 10-13, 838 P.2d at 90-92.
14. Id at 9, 838 P.2d at 89.
15. Id, 838 P.2d at 90. The court appointed a social worker to gather mitigating evidence for
Dodd. Brief for Amicus Curiae at Appendix B, State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86
(1992) (No. 57414-6).
16. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 25, 838 P.2d at 98.
17. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Dodd (No. 57414-6).
18. Id. at 22.
19. Id. at 20-23.
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After considering the prosecution evidence, the jury sentenced Dodd
to death.20
After sentencing, Dodd wrote to the trial court asking for permis-
sion to waive his right to appeal. He also requested that the supreme
court limit appellate review of his case to the procedures mandated by
statute, and forgo general review of his conviction and sentencing.21
The trial court referred Dodd's request to the supreme court.22 The
supreme court ordered the trial court to hold a fact-finding hearing to
determine whether Dodd was competent to waive appeal and whether
Dodd's waiver was voluntary.23 The court also appointed a new attor-
ney to represent Dodd at that hearing, and redesignated Dodd's appel-
late counsel as amicus curiae to argue the waiver issue and any appeals
before the supreme court.24
After the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found Dodd compe-
tent to waive his appeal rights.25 In a seven-two decision, the supreme
court held that a capital defendant may waive general review;26 as a
result, the court did not consider the four errors in Dodd's guilt and
sentencing proceedings that amici alleged on appeal. 27 The court did
not allow Dodd to waive statutory sentence review.28 In reviewing
Dodd's sentence, the court considered the mitigating evidence that
Dodd had withheld from sentencing.29 It affirmed Dodd's sentence.30
In a concurring opinion, one justice objected to the majority's consid-
eration of the mitigating evidence.31 Two other justices dissented,
arguing on statutory and policy grounds that a capital defendant may
not waive general review.3 2
20. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 10, 838 P.2d at 90.
21. Id. at 10, 838 P.2d at 90.
22. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 11, Dodd (No. 57414-6).
23. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 10, 838 P.2d at 90.
24. Id. at 10, 838 P.2d at 90.
25. Id. at 12-13, 838 P.2d at 91-92.
26. Id. at 4, 838 P.2d at 87.
27. Id. at 30-31, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting). Amici argued that the trial court
erroneously admitted parts of Dodd's diary in the conviction proceeding and erroneously
admitted Dodd's confession and other evidence at the sentencing proceeding; amici also argued
that the failure of Dodd's counsel to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding
violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
28. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 4, 838 P.2d at 87.
29. IM. at 25, 838 P.2d at 98.
30. Id. at 29, 838 P.2d at 100.
31. Id. at 29-30, 838 P.2d at 100 (Anderson, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 30-31, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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II. THE DODD COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT CAPITAL SENTENCES DO NOT REQUIRE
GENERAL REVIEW OF CONVICTION AND
SENTENCING
Although the U.S. Constitution does not require general review of
all death penalty convictions and sentences, some state courts have
found that such review is necessary to ensure the state's interest in
reliable capital punishment. The Dodd court's holding that a defend-
ant may waive general review of conviction and sentence for error
jeopardizes both the reliability of capital punishment in Washington
and the competency of the state supreme court's mandatory sentence
review. First, the court cannot ensure the state's interest in reliable
capital punishment without reviewing the entire record of each case
for error. Second, the court cannot competently perform sentence
review without first reviewing the conviction and sentencing for error.
Finally, the Dodd court based its holding on inaccurate statutory
interpretation. The court also relied upon an incomplete analysis of
authority, and inapposite U.S. Supreme Court holdings.
A. Review of Capital Sentences
1. Washington's Capital Punishment Statute
Washington's death penalty scheme provides for bifurcated guilt
and sentencing proceedings and mandatory supreme court review of
all decisions to impose a death sentence. In the guilt phase, the
defendant must be convicted of aggravated first degree murder.33 For
such a conviction, the judge or jury must first find the defendant guilty
of premeditated first degree murder, and then identify at least one of
ten aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute. 4
The focus of the sentencing proceeding is on mitigation. When
deciding whether to impose death or life in prison, the jury or judge
weighs the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating evidence
to determine whether the defendant deserves leniency. 35 In this pro-
ceeding, the jury or judge may consider only relevant mitigating evi-
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (1992).
34. Id. § 10.95.020.
35. Id. § 10.95.060(4). The statute requires the sentencing jury to answer the question,
"[A]re you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating
circumstances to merit leniency?"
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dence and rebuttal of such evidence, the defendant's prior criminal
activity, and the statutory aggravating circumstances.36
In sentence review, the supreme court must make three determina-
tions: (1) that the evidence considered at sentencing justifies the death
sentence, (2) that the sentence is proportional to other Washington
death sentences, and (3) that the sentencing court did not impose the
sentence through passion or prejudice. 37 The court makes these deter-
minations based on the entire trial record.38 A capital defendant may
not waive the limited sentence review required by statute.3 9
2. Constitutional Requirements
Bifurcated proceedings such as Washington's provide the individu-
alized scrutiny of capital defendants that the Eighth Amendment
demands.' The Eighth Amendment further requires adequate statu-
tory guidelines to ensure that judges and juries impose the death pen-
36. Id. § 10.95.060(3); see also State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079
(1984) (restricting aggravating evidence at sentencing to the record of convictions, statutory
aggravating circumstances, rebuttal of mitigating evidence, and, if the jury did not convict, the
facts and circumstances of the murder).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (1992). The statute states: "Whenever a defendant is
sentenced to death, upon entry of the judgment and sentence in the trial court the sentence shall
be reviewed on the record by the supreme court of Washington." Section 10.95.130 requires the
supreme court to answer three questions in sentence review:
(a) Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the affirmative finding to the question
posed by RCW 10.95.060(4); and (b) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant...; and (c) Whether the sentence of death was brought about through passion or
prejudice.
38. Id. Washington statute requires that the trial court provide the supreme court transcripts
of the guilt and sentencing proceedings and the clerk's papers from each capital case. Id.
§ 10.95.110.
39. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 14-15, 838 P.2d 86, 92-93 (1992).
40. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court held that Georgia's capital
punishment statute violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment" because it allowed juries too much discretion in deciding when to impose death
sentences. Four years later, the Court upheld three of the thirty-five state statutes passed in the
wake of Furman, and struck down two others. The Court upheld statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976), while striking down statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In Gregg, the Court said that bifurcation was likely to
cure the deficiencies cited in Furman because the sentencer would be able to consider a wider
array of mitigating evidence than the trial court could. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-93. The Court
rejected North Carolina's and Louisiana's provision of mandatory death sentences for some
crimes on the ground that a sentencer could not consider the characteristics of an individual
defendant. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-36.
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alty uniformly.41  States have satisfied this requirement by codifying
specific aggravating circumstances and by directing the sentencer to
weigh these circumstances against any mitigating evidence before
imposing a death sentence.42
The Eighth Amendment does not require appellate review.43 The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that such review safeguards against
random or arbitrary imposition of capital punishment.' The Court
has not directly addressed whether a capital defendant convicted
under a statute with automatic appellate review may waive or limit the
scope of that review. 5
3. State Statutes and Case Law
Although the U.S. Constitution does not require appellate review,
all but one of the thirty-seven state capital punishment statutes pro-
vide for automatic appellate review of conviction, sentence, or both.46
Of these thirty-six statutes, only four address a defendant's right to
waive appeal or review. One requires supreme court review of both
conviction and sentence despite a defendant's failure to appeal.47 The
other three require sentence review but allow a defendant to waive
affirmative appeal and review of conviction.48
41. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-95.
42. IaL at 197. The Supreme Court said that statutory enumeration of aggravating
circumstances and a requirement that the sentencer consider mitigating evidence provide enough
guidance to the judge and jury to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. See also supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text.
43. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54-59 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that in Gregg,
a plurality rather than a majority stated that appellate review was required, and that neither
Proffltt nor Jurek specifically required appellate review).
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206; see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-53.
45. The Court has refused to allow capital defendants to waive oertain rights that other
criminal defendants may waive, such as presence during trial. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
575-79 (1884).
46. Arkansas is the exception. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to -617 (Michie 1991).
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26(10) (1992). The statute states: "In capital cases where the
sentence of death has been imposed and the defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the
case shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court .... "
48. Missouri's statute states that in addition to sentence review, "there shall be a right of
direct appeal of the conviction to the supreme court of Missouri. This right of appeal may be
waived by the defendant." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035(7) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Nevada's
statute provides for automatic appeal of death sentences "unless the defendant or his counsel
affirmatively waives the appeal within 30 days after the rendition of the judgment." NEv. REv.
STAT. § 177.055(1) (1991). Tennessee's statute provides for automatic rfview of death sentences,
stating that when a defendant "does not appeal the conviction of first degree murder, then the
trial court shall certify, within ninety (90) days after the judgment has become final, the record
relating to punishment" and transmit it to the supreme court for review. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-206(a)(2) (1992).
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Case law on the issue is mixed. Courts in seven states refuse to
allow capital defendants to waive or limit appellate review.' These
courts hold that waiver or limited review threatens the overriding state
interest in reliability of capital punishment. For example, the Utah
Supreme Court held that to maintain the integrity of capital punish-
ment, the court must review the entire record for error.5 In denying
waiver, the Alabama Supreme Court held that waiver is contrary to
the state's overriding interest in determining that the death penalty is
imposed only for compelling reasons.51 The Idaho Supreme Court
held that the gravity and infrequency of capital punishment demand
review of the entire record for error. 2 On the other hand, four state
courts in addition to Washington's allow capital defendants to waive
general review.53
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes the right of states to
require appellate review of capital convictions and sentences. In Mas-
sie v. Sumner,54 the Ninth Circuit upheld a California statute that pro-
vides automatic appeal of all capital sentences regardless of a
defendant's wishes. 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's
claim that automatic appeal violates due process. 56 It held that appel-
late review of death sentences is a duty that the California Legislature
imposed upon the state supreme court, and a defendant may not inter-
fere with this duty.57 It compared mandatory appeal to other proce-
dures required in criminal cases, such as competency hearings and
determinations that a factual basis exists for a guilty plea. Finally, it
49. Evans v. State, 361 So. 2d 666, 667 (Ala. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); State v.
Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 789-91 (Ariz.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992); People v. Stanworth,
457 P.2d 889, 898-99 (Cal. 1969); Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1978), cerL denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 192-93 (Idaho 1981); Commonwealth v.
McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Utah 1989).
50. Holland, 777 P.2d at 1022 ("Mhe integrity of the law as an institution must be sustained,
notwithstanding the desire of an individual defendant.").
51. Evans, 361 So. 2d at 667 (recognizing "the State's dominant and overriding interest in
ensuring that the death penalty is imposed only for the utmost of compelling reasons").
52. Osborn, 631 P.2d at 192-93.
53. Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F. Supp. 685, 710-13 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Martin v.
Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Louisiana statute), cera denied, 469 U.S.
1028 (1984); Franz v. State, 754 S.W.2d 839, 842-44 (Ark. 1988); Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95
(Ind. 1981); Kirksey v. State, 814 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Nev.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 603 (1991).
54. 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (Deering Supp. 1992). The statute states: "When upon any
plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant without
any action by him or her or his or her counsel."
56. Massie, 624 F.2d at 73-74.
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id
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found that California had "a strong interest in the accuracy and fair-
ness of all its criminal proceedings."5 9
B. Limited Sentence Review Does Not Ensure Washington's Interest
in Reliable Capital Punishment
Sentence review ensures Washington's interest in reliable capital
punishment. The Dodd court overlooked the importance of reviewing
both conviction and sentence for error when reviewing a capital sen-
tence. The primary purpose of sentence review is to ensure reliable
capital punishment; protecting a defendant's rights is a secondary
aim.' The supreme court's refusal to allow a defendant to waive sen-
tence review6' implies this conclusion.62
Capital punishment is not reliably imposed unless the state executes
only those defendants whose crimes and characteristics truly merit
death sentences. However, errors in the trial or guilty plea process
may hamper the sentencing courts' ability to accurately assess defend-
ants' crimes and characteristics. Thus, when a capital defendant
chooses not to appeal, the supreme court must scrutinize the complete
record of conviction and sentencing on its own initiative. Only then
can it determine whether the sentence was appropriate.
In holding that a defendant may limit sentence review, the Dodd
court misconceived the nature of sentence review. The court consid-
ered sentence review to be invariably adversarial; however, this is not
so when a capital defendant forgoes appeal. In such a case, sentence
review becomes an administrative proceeding intended not to protect
the defendant's rights but only to ensure the state's interest in reliable
capital punishment. Permitting a defendant to limit the scope of this
review thwarts this state interest.
Even if Dodd's punishment was appropriate, limited supreme court
review of future capital cases with different facts may fail to weed out
those cases in which a trial court has imposed an unwarranted capital
sentence. The combination of the egregiousness of Dodd's crimes,
confessions, guilty plea, and waiver suggested that his execution was
appropriate. The Dodd holding, however, will be invoked by defend-
59. Id.
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) (describing appellate review as a provision
"designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of
convicted defendants").
61. In re Rupe, 115 Wash. 2d 379, 388, 798 P.2d 780, 785 (1990).
62. As Dodd illustrates, Washington courts place other limits on the rights of criminal
defendants, including competency hearings for waiver of appeal and oversight of guilty pleas.
State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 8-10, 838 P.2d 86, 89-91 (1992).
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ants who maintain their innocence but refuse to appeal in order to
avoid life imprisonment without hope of release. In such cases, the
court will face a voluminous record and thus a much greater
probability of harmful error. To ensure fairness and reliability, the
court must review this entire record for error or risk the execution of
an innocent defendant.
C. The Supreme Court Cannot Competently Review a Capital
Sentence Without Reviewing the Complete Record for Error
Supreme court review of death sentences seeks to determine
whether the evidence justified the sentence, whether the sentence was
proportional, and whether the sentence resulted from passion or preju-
dice.6" As Dodd illustrates, these findings are not credible if the trial
court admitted unfairly prejudicial evidence. To determine whether
the evidence justified the sentence, the supreme court must be sure
that the trial court properly ruled on the admission of aggravating and
mitigating evidence. Because evidence of aggravation that was
improperly admitted during the guilt phase will influence the trier's
sentencing decision, the court must review the entire record to con-
duct a meaningful sentence review.
Dodd demonstrates the importance of thorough supreme court
review for error. The judge at Dodd's sentencing, over defense objec-
tions, admitted excerpts from Dodd's diaries discussing castration,
vivisection, and other types of torture that Dodd had not inflicted on
any of his victims." These excerpts were highly prejudicial, and the
trial court probably should have excluded them.65 Had the Dodd
court so concluded, it would have disregarded the evidence in its eval-
uation of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Dodd's death
sentence.
However, the Dodd court evaluated the sufficiency of evidence
assuming that the trial court properly admitted all evidence. 66 Thus,
it must have considered the prejudicial diary excerpts. Because its
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence was based on a deficient
record, the court could not conclude with any assurance that the evi-
dence justified Dodd's sentence.
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64, See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
65. See State v. Rupe, 101 Wash. 2d 664, 704-07, 683 P.2d 571, 594-97 (1984) (holding death
sentence was improper because of introduction at sentencing of evidence about defendant's gun
collection, in violation of WAsH. R. EVID. 403).
66. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 24-25, 838 P.2d at 97-98.
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Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence also affects the
supreme court's proportionality determination in sen'tence review. To
determine whether the sentence under review is proportional, the
court compares the facts of the crime and the defendant's characteris-
tics to the facts and defendants in other Washington death sentence
cases.67 The Dodd court based its proportionality determination in
part upon its finding that Dodd's personal characteristics were similiar
to those of the defendant in State v. Rupe.68 Like Dodd, Rupe was
sentenced to death even though he lacked a significant criminal his-
tory. 69 The court noted that Dodd exhibited a pattern of predatory,
sexually deviant behavior and was dangerous.70 Improperly admitted
evidence may have influenced this finding, however. Thus, the court's
proportionality determination was not meaningful.
D. The Dodd Court's Statutory Interpretation Was Flawed
The Dodd court's analysis of Washington's capital punishment stat-
ute was unconvincing. The court first maintained that the statute
makes sentence review mandatory because it states that the supreme
court "shall" review all capital sentences. 71 The coult then noted that
the statute distinguishes between sentence review and appeals.72 The
language of another provision of the statute specifies the period in
which sentence review and appellate review, "if any," must be under-
taken.73 From the words "if any," the court concluded that general
review is not required.74 The court cited the statute's directive that
sentence review is "in addition to any [general] appeal" as further evi-
dence that general review may be waived by a defendant.75
However, such analysis is irrelevant to the real question in Dodd,
which is the scope of the mandatory sentence review. The statute does
not directly address this matter. A credible review must cover all
aspects of the guilt or sentencing proceedings that bear on whether the
penalty was properly imposed. Therefore, the statute contemplates
only that the defendant may waive review of the actual verdict.
The court also failed to discuss a provision of the statute that
implies sentence review requires general review of the conviction.
67. See supra note 37.
68. 101 Wash. 2d 664, 683 P.2d 571 (1984).
69. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 27, 838 P.2d at 99.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 14, 838 P.2d at 92.
72. Id. at 15, 838 P.2d at 93.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.150 (1992).
74. Dodd. 120 Wash. 2d at 15, 838 P.2d at 93.
75. Id
744
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This provision requires that the trial court forward the complete rec-
ord of a capital cases to the supreme court, which must review the
sentence "on the record."76 That the statute contains such a provision
suggests that the Washington Legislature intended that the supreme
court review each conviction for error; otherwise, it would have
required that the trial court send only the sentencing record to the
supreme court. For example, the Tennessee capital punishment stat-
ute specifies that when a defendant chooses not to appeal, the trial
court need send only the sentencing record to the reviewing court.7 7
Because Washington's statute does not include a similar provision, the
Dodd court should have concluded that the Legislature did not intend
that a defendant be allowed to waive review of the record of
conviction.
E. The Dodd Court's Analysis of Relevant Authority Was
Incomplete and Misleading
The Dodd court misrepresented the weight of authority on the issue
of whether capital sentences require general review. In arguing that
the weight of authority supports a defendant's right to waive general
review,7" the Dodd court cited six cases decided in four states that
stand for this proposition79 and attempted to distinguish four others
that reached the opposite conclusion." The cases upon which the
court relied represent only a slice of the authority on the issue.
Only seven of the thirty-seven states with capital punishment allow
defendants to waive or limit review: the four cited by the Dodd court"
and the three that expressly allow waiver by statute.8 2 Seven other
states have refused to allow waiver, including four cited in Dodd83 and
three others that the Dodd court inexplicably failed to mention. 4 The
remaining states have not addressed the issue.
The Dodd court's attempts to distinguish the adverse authority are
unconvincing. The court argued that the Arizona, California, and
Florida statutes contain broader language than the Washington stat-
ute. It stated that the three states' statutes require review of the "judg-
76. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 48.
78. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 15, 838 P.2d at 93.
79. Id. at 18-19, 838 P.2d at 94-95.
80. Id. at 20, 838 P.2d at 95-96.
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 20, 838 P.2d at 95-96.
84. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The court failed to mention Alabama, Idaho,
and Utah.
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ment" or the "judgment of conviction and sentence," while
Washington's requires only "sentence" review. 5 However, the court
misrepresented the Arizona and California statutes. The Arizona stat-
ute does not mention review of conviction or judgment; it states only
that the supreme court must review the entire record whenever a capi-
tal defendant appeals a judgment.16 The California statute does not
mention review at all; it provides for automatic "appeal" whenever a
"judgment of death" is imposed. 7 More importantly, the Dodd court
overlooked the fact that both the Arizona and California courts based
their holdings on their states' interest in reliable capital punishment
rather than on statutory interpretation.88
The Dodd court also sought to distinguish a Pennsylvania court's
holding requiring review of a capital conviction despite a defendant's
waiver. The Dodd court distinguished this case by noting that the
Pennsylvania court found Pennsylvania's death penalty statute uncon-
stitutional, while the Washington Supreme Court has upheld the
Washington statute.89 This reasoning is flawed, however. Like the
Arizona and California courts, the Pennsylvania court based its hold-
ing on the state's interest in ensuring that executions are legal.' °
The Dodd court also relied on inapposite U.S. Supreme Court cases
to support its holding that a defendant may waive general review. The
cases that the court cited, Gilmore v. Utah91 and Whitmore v. Arkan-
sas,9 2 are not in point. Those two cases are similar to Dodd only in
that the defendant in each case sought to waive appeal of a capital
sentence. However, the cases are distinguishable because the defend-
ants were convicted under statutes that, in contrast to the Washington
85. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 20, 838 P.2d at 95-96.
86. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4035 (Supp. 1992). The statute states: "Upon appeal from
a final judgment of conviction, the supreme court shall review all ruling. affecting the judgment.
... T]he supreme court shall review the entire record."
87. See supra note 55.
88. State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 790 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992) (rejecting a
state claim that a statute required review of "judgment" but not of sentence and holding that
such a distinction "would defeat the obvious purpose of requiring mandatory appeals in capital
cases, which is to insure that the death sentence is properly and constitutionally applied"); People
v. Stanworth, 457 P.2d 889, 899 (Cal. 1969) ("It is not entirely [the defendant's appeal] since the
state, too, has an indisputable interest in it which the appellant cannot extinguish.").
89. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 20, 838 P.2d at 95.
90. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978) ("The waiver rule cannot be
exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue-the propriety
of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.").
91. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
92. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
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statute, did not provide automatic review.93 The Supreme Court held
in both cases that third parties lack standing to appeal on behalf of
competent capital defendants.94 This was not an issue in Dodd; Dodd
dealt with the scope of statutorily required sentence review, which the
state supreme court may initiate and conduct without participation by
a third party or the defendant. Thus, contrary to the assertion in
Dodd, the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided relevant authority on
whether a Washington defendant may limit sentence review. 9
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit provides clear authority for the
Washington Supreme Court to require general review in capital
cases.96 The Ninth Circuit held that a state's interest in reliable capi-
tal punishment supersedes a defendant's right to waive review.97 The
Dodd court could have relied upon this as authority for denying a cap-
ital defendant the right to waive general review.
In summary, the Dodd holding that a capital defendant may waive
general review of conviction and sentence for error fails to safeguard
Washington's interest in reliable capital punishment. The holding is
based on flawed analysis of Washington's capital punishment statute.
It also relies upon a misleading analysis of authority from other states
and upon inapposite U.S. Supreme Court cases.
III. DODD CLOUDED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
AVAILABLE MITIGATING EVIDENCE MUST BE
PRESENTED AT THE SENTENCING
PROCEEDING
The Dodd court left unclear whether mitigating evidence must be
presented at sentencing. Specifically, the court failed to satisfactorily
address two problems that arise when a capital defendant withholds
all available mitigating evidence. First, the sentencer cannot give the
defendant the individualized consideration that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires. Second, the reviewing court cannot determine whether
a sentence was proportional and justified by the evidence.
93. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 152; Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1016-17. The Utah statute has since
been amended to require review. See supra note 47.
94. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 151; Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1016-17.
95. Justice White, dissenting in Gilmore, claimed that the defendant could not waive appellate
review. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1018. Justice Burger, in the plurality opinion, responded,
"Whatever may be said as to the merits of this suggestion, the question is simply not before us."
Id at 1017.
96. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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The Dodd court refused to consider amici's argument on appeal that
the withholding of all mitigating evidence violated the Eighth Amend-
ment. By considering Dodd's mitigating evidence in its review of his
sentence, however, the Dodd majority effectively established precedent
for requiring presentation of such evidence at sentencing. The court
should have dealt with the problem more directly, by establishing a
procedure for presenting mitigating evidence when a defendant refuses
to offer it.
A. Mitigating Evidence Is Indispensable in Capital Sentencing
Mitigating evidence is indispensable to a constitutional death pen-
alty determination. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment demands that the sentencing court accord all capital
defendants individualized consideration.98 Individualized considera-
tion is designed to ensure that death sentences do not result from arbi-
trary and capricious proceedings.99 Individualized consideration
requires consideration of mitigating evidence, which is the only evi-
dence of a defendant's character and past history that the sentencing
court receives. Thus, a court cannot constitutionally impose a death
sentence without considering the available mitigating evidence.
Mitigating evidence is any evidence that supports sparing a defend-
ant's life despite the defendant's commission of a capital crime." It
may include details of a defendant's character, prior acts, and past
history; a comparison of the defendant's crime to similar crimes for
which other defendants received lesser sentences; and rebuttal of pros-
ecution evidence in favor of execution. 0 1 In Washington, the sen-
tencer weighs this evidence against the aggravating circumstances of
the crime to determine whether death or life in prison is the appropri-
ate sentence. 102
B. Courts Have Split on Whether a Capital Defendant May
Withhold All Mitigating Evidence
The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided whether a capital
defendant may voluntarily withhold all mitigating evidence. How-
ever, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits statu-
tory or judicial limits on relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant
98. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98 (1976).
99. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
100. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 318 (1983).
101. Id. at 335-37.
102. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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offers. 103 It has also held that an attorney may accede to a client's
instructions to withhold all mitigating evidence without violating the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."°
Courts have rejected ineffective assistance claims for various rea-
sons. First, requiring an attorney to offer mitigating evidence despite a
client's objections creates an ethical conflict. An attorney must repre-
sent a client's interests, °5 including the choice to be sentenced to die.
Second, such a holding could enable any defendant to avoid a death
sentence by simply withholding all mitigating evidence, and then suc-
cessfully appealling on the ground that counsel should have offered
such evidence.10 6 Finally, such a holding might encourage defendants
to represent themselves so that they can maintain control over the evi-
dence, at the cost of significant legal advantage. 107
Some state courts, however, have held that a capital defendant may
not keep all mitigating evidence from the sentencing court. An exam-
ple is the California Supreme Court, which relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court holdings that state statutes or judges may not prevent consider-
ation of any relevant mitigating evidence.108 The California court rea-
soned that, regardless of who keeps mitigating evidence out, doing so
prevents the sentencing court from giving the defendant the individu-
alized consideration that the Eighth Amendment requires.109 The
103. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (holding trial judge could not
exclude relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603-04 (1978) (holding
Ohio law could not set limits on mitigating evidence a sentencer might consider). Consistent
with this view, Washington's statute enumerates some appropriate types of mitigating evidence,
but expressly states that any other relevant evidence may be admitted at sentencing. WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.070 (1992).
104. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788-96 (1987). The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants the right to "have the assistance of counsel." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Lower federal courts have similarly held that Washington capital defendants who did not offer
mitigating evidence were not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. See e.g., Campbell v.
Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1992) (requiring an attorney
to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation"). WASH. CT. R.P.C.
1.2(1) contains identical language.
106. Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279-80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see also People v. Bloom,
774 P.2d 698, 718-19 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990).
107. People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 653 (Cal. 1989), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 224 (1990).
108. People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925, 931 (Cal. 1985). Although the California Supreme Court
disapproved Deere in Bloom, 774 P.2d at 718-19, and in Lang, 782 P.2d at 653, Bloom and Lang
may be distinguished from Dodd because some mitigating evidence was offered in both of those
cases. Bloom, 774 P.2d at 729 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Lang, 782 P.2d at 653.
109. Deere, 710 P.2d at 931-32 (referring to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
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Dodd majority, however, refused to consider whether Dodd's with-
holding of all mitigating evidence was unconstitutional. 10
The California court further held that the state's interest in a relia-
ble death penalty determination could not be guaranteed without miti-
gating evidence.' 1 In addition, a supreme court must consider at least
some mitigating evidence in sentence review; such evidence constitutes
a significant part of the evidence that the reviewing court examines
when deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate.11a The New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in refusing to allow a
capital defendant to withhold all mitigating evidence."' 3 The New
Jersey court concluded that a sentencing jury cannot discharge its stat-
utory or moral duties without mitigating evidence. 14
C. The Washington Supreme Court Should Require That a Neutral
Party Present Mitigating Evidence on Behalf of Defendants
Who Refuse To Offer Such Evidence
The Dodd court failed to consider the implications of a sentencing
proceeding at which all available mitigating evidence is withheld.
Washington's capital punishment scheme demands presentation at
sentencing of available mitigating evidence. The judge or jury weighs
the aggravating circumstances proved in the guilt phase against the
mitigating evidence presented at sentencing to determine whether a
death sentence is appropriate."' The only evidence that the sentencer
may consider is that of mitigation, past convictions, and aggravating
circumstances enumerated in the statute.'16 If all available mitigating
evidence is withheld, however, the jury has nothing against which to
balance the aggravating circumstances and a death sentence becomes
virtually automatic. 117
110. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 40-48, 838 P.2d 86, 106-10 (1992) (Utter, J.,
dissenting).
111. Deere, 710 P.2d at 931.
112. Id. at 930.
113. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 997 (N.J. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1017 (1989).
114. Id. at 994. The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985), found that a jury that imposed a death sentence without the benefit of mitigating
evidence neglected its duty to weigh aggravating circumstances and mitigating evidence, and had
no choice but to impose a death sentence. The court stated: "The finding of an aggravating
circumstance is but the threshold question. The jury must then weigh the evidence before it
imposes the death penalty." Id. at 278.
115. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
117. See Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1987) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (arguing absence of any mitigating evidence rendered death penalty automatic).
750
Vol. 68:735, 1993
Review of Death Penalty Cases
As the Dodd majority tacitly acknowledged, Washington's capital
punishment statute also requires that the supreme court consider miti-
gating evidence during sentence review. The statute expressly directs
the supreme court to consider individual characteristics of the defend-
ant when the court determines whether a death sentence is propor-
tional to other capital sentences imposed in the state.11 Such
characteristics might include a history of childhood abuse that would
only come to light as mitigating evidence presented at sentencing.
This history would be barred during the conviction phase on the
ground of irrelevancy.' 19 In addition, without mitigating evidence a
reviewing court has no basis to determine that the sentencer was justi-
fied in deciding against leniency. 120
The Dodd majority acknowledged the necessity of considering miti-
gating evidence in sentence review. In its review of Dodd's sentence, it
considered the mitigating evidence that Dodd had withheld from sen-
tencing but that amici had presented on appeal. 12 1 The majority
weighed this evidence in sentence review and concluded that no jury
would reach a different verdict after having considered it.
122
As the concurring opinion noted, the Dodd majority failed to
explain why it considered evidence that the sentencing jury never
heard. 12 When an appellate court concludes that the resolution of an
issue on appeal requires additional evidence, the proper procedure is
for the court to direct the trial court to develop the additional evi-
dence. 124 The Dodd majority failed to take this step. However, its
consideration of the mitigating evidence provides authority for a trial
court to ensure that all mitigating evidence will not be withheld.
A more direct approach would be for the Washington Supreme
Court to establish a procedure by which a trial court may obtain miti-
gating evidence when a defendant refuses to supply it. There are at
least three appropriate procedures for soliciting such evidence. First,
a trial court may appoint a social worker to gather mitigating evi-
dence. For example, in Dodd the trial judge appointed a social worker
to collect mitigating evidence for Dodd, presumably because defense
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130 (1992). The statute states that the court must evaluate
the proportionality of the death sentence "considering both the crime and the defendant."
119. WASH. R. EvID. 403.
120. People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925, 930 (Cal. 1985).
121. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 25, 838 P.2d 86, 98 (1992).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 29-30, 838 P.2d at 100 (Anderson, J., concurring).
124. WASH. Cr. R.A.P. 9.11 (1992).
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counsel did not have the time or money to gather such evidence. 125
Second, the trial court may appoint amici to provide mitigating evi-
dence, just as amici in Dodd provided mitigating evidence in sentence
review. 126 Third, a neutral agency may submit to the sentencing court
a presentence report that includes mitigating evidence, as the Depart-
ment of Corrections must in all felony sex offense cases.' 27
Providing mitigating evidence through a "truly neutral" third party
would resolve the various dilemmas that traditionally prevented courts
from requiring presentation of mitigating evidence. Defense counsel
would not have to act contrary to a client's wishes.' 28 Defendants
could not automatically avoid a death sentence by simply refusing to
offer mitigating evidence and then successfully appealing on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.'29 Nor would they be
encouraged to waive counsel to gain control of the presentation of evi-
dence.1 30 A neutral agency is particularly well-suited to this task
because it would not complicate the proceedings by arguing a position
different from that of the prosecution and defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
By allowing a capital defendant to waive general review of convic-
tion and sentence for error, the Dodd court stripped the statutorily
mandated sentence review of features needed to ensure reliable imposi-
tion of the death penalty in Washington. By clouding the issue of
whether a defendant may withhold all available mitigating evidence at
sentencing, the court not only failed to ensure the individualized con-
sideration of capital defendants and crimes that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires, but it also rendered sentence review unreliable and
sentencing proceedings virtually meaningless in some cases. The Dodd
court should have required general review of all capital convictions
and sentences and the presentation by a neutral third party of all avail-
able mitigating evidence in capital cases regardless of a defendant's
wishes.
125. Brief for Amicus Curiae at Appendix B, State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86
(1992) (No. 57414-6).
126. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 25, 838 P.2d at 98.
127. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.110 (1992). The statute requires the Department
of Corrections to submit a presentence report to the trial court in all felony sex offense cases.
128. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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